Access security is the key obstacle of the rapid popularization of wireless mesh network (WMN). We suggest the proxy group signature scheme based on identity in this paper. This scheme is combined with proxy group signature and identity-based group signature, based on designated hierarchical proxy architecture for WMN. An anonymous mutual authentication scheme is thus achieved, which not only simplifies the complex management of PKI but also guarantees anonymous authentication and owns high handover authentication efficiency. Performance and security analysis show that the scheme in this paper is efficient and resilient to a series of security and anonymity attacks.
Introduction
Compared with traditional wireless self-organized network (MANET), wireless mesh network (WMN) owns higher reliability, larger data throughput, and lower disturbance, as well as stronger scalability due to its unique mesh structure. As a result, WMN is able to provide highspeed wireless access service for mobile users in a wide area. WMN is now attracting more and more attentions in both academia and industry [1] . WMN is a kind of wireless multi-hop radio network, whose promotion and deployment depend heavily on security issues relative to cable network and WLAN [2] . To keep malicious nodes from accessing and provide reliable service to WMN users, two-way authentication between mesh client (MC) and access network is necessary and becomes the foundation of the whole WMN security [3] . However, users' privacy information is always carried in the authentication signaling. So to protect user's privacy is important during mutual authentication in the research of WMN access security [2] .
For the past few decades, scholars have lots of researches in WMN access security, which aim at achieving safe and efficient access authentication systems. In Ref [4] , the authors applied identity-based encryption and signature scheme to WMN access authentication. Mutual authentication is adopted between MC and authentication server without the protection of MC's privacy. Ref [5] 's authors utilized Tor (The Onion Router Protocol) to protect the security of WMN router and the privacy of MC. But access authentication is ignored. Moreover, the extraexpense for saving and maintaining a routing table made the scheme not profitable. The authors of Ref [6] adopted Ring Signature for WMN anonymous authentication and communication. However, each MR needs to manage two certificates, which results in extra-burden. Besides, the cost for handling ring signature during authentication is large.
We proposed a new scheme, which is the combination of proxy group signature and identity-based group signature, based on designated hierarchical proxy architecture for WMN. An anonymous mutual authentication scheme is thus achieved, which not only simplifies the complex management of PKI but also guarantees anonymous authentication and owns high handover authentication efficiency. Security and performance analysis show that our scheme is efficient and is resilient to a series of security and anonymity attacks.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the cryptographic primitives. The identity-based proxy group signature scheme was presented in Section 3. The anonymous access authentication scheme with different roaming is in Section 4. We provide security and performance analysis in Section 5. Last, we make the conclusion in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Bilinear pairings
G 1 , G 2 , and G T are groups of the same prime order q. Consider that discrete logarithm problem(DLP) is hard in G 1 , G 2 , and G T [8] . A bilinear paring can be defined if the mapping e:G 1 × G 2 → G T satisfying the following properties.
(1) Bilinearity:
As how to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) ∈ G T , there existed an efficient algorithm.
Hard problems and security assumptions
G 1 and G 2 are cyclic groups of prime order q, and P is a generator of group G 1 . For bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 as well as a, b, c, x, y ∈ Z * q , the assumptions that related to this paper are described as followings.
(1) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:
Sample:(P, a, PbP) for some a, b ∈ Z * 
Certificate-based signature
Based on the certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme [7, 11] , Kang et al. presented certificate-based signature(CBS) scheme . First of all, users' public and private keys are generated by public parameters. Then users apply certificates from CA as part of temporary signing key. And it addressed the key escrow problem. Besides, it is not necessary to establish the secure channel between users and CA. The process of CBS is described as below.
(1) CBS.Setup: Given cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 generated by CA and the bilinear pairing e :
CA computes system public key PK c = S c P after choosing generator P ∈ G 1 and random private key S C ∈ Z * q ; CA selects two hash functions
Users select their own private key S A ∈ Z * q randomly to compute public key PK A = S A P. 
Given message m, users select r ∈ Z * q and generate the signature σ = (U 1 , U 2 , V ), where
Verifier will check whether e(PK C , U 1 + hP A )e(PK A , U 2 + hP A ) =?e(P, V ) when given the signature σ to confirm the validity of σ . Returns 1 if valid, else returns 0.
Identity-based proxy group signature
Identity-based Proxy Group Signature (IPGS) scheme is the combination of proxy group signature [9] and identitybased group signature [10] . In IPGS, the signing rights can be delegated in turn from the initial signer to proxy signer then to group manager. Anyone in this group can sign a message for the initial signer. As for the verifier, the only thing he can do is to verify the validity of a signature but cannot tell which specific group member generates the signature. The group manager is responsible for setting up the group. When dispute happens, only the group manager can disclose signer's real identity. The process of IPGS is described as following.
(1) IPGS.Setup: Original signer generates two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and the bilinear pairing e :
Then he selects a generator P ∈ G 1 and random number S O ∈ Z * q as private key. The corresponding public key PK O = S O P ; Three hash functions It is necessary to execute the following protocol if a user (group member) wants to join a group. r ∈ Z * q was the long-term private key selected by the group member and then it figures out the public key Q ID =H 1 (ID); Group member sends ID, rP to group manager to compute S ID = S g H 2 (Q ID ||rP) . Then group manager distributes S ID and auth to group member through secure channel; (S ID , r) is the group member's private key; the public key is Q ID . Group member selects x i ∈ Z * q , i = 1, 2, ...k and sends ID, S ID , rP, x i P, and rx i P to group manager through secure channel. Group manager verifies S ID =?S g H 2 (Q ID ||rP) and e(rx i P, P) =?e(x i P, rP). If successful, group manager sends S i = S g H 2 (T||rx i P) to user. T presents the life cycle of the private key. User needs to update the private key if T is expired. (S i , rx i P) is the user's group signing key. (4) IPGS.Sign:
Signer signs the message m through computing IPGS is the foundation of our proposed scheme in this paper to achieve anonymous access authentication. In Ref. [9] , authors show that IPGS is safe under q-SDH assumption. IPGS simplifies the management and maintenance of the certificate for both signer and verifier.
Anonymous access authentication scheme
Proxy-based hierarchical network architecture
The relevant notations and explanations used in our scheme are shown in Table 1 .
We present a proxy-based hierarchical network architecture shown as Fig. 1 [12] . TR is the first layer. As the architecture's root trust, TR generates public parameter and distributes warrant to the second-layer entities, Domain Managers(DMs).
After getting the warrant from TR, DM delegates the signing rights to the third-layer entities, a quantity of WMN groups which includes GW, several mesh routers and MCs. As the manager of a WMN group, GW holds the group master key and allocates private key for every member in the group. Besides, GW issues the certificates for legitimate roaming users.
Trust model
As shown in 
Adversary model
In this paper, we assume that adversary owns the ability to launch both active and passive attacks. The adversary can break all the nodes and eavesdrop all the communications between nodes in our network. While it does not mean that the adversary holds boundless information stealing and computing capacity. In other words, the adversary cannot guess the private key of the relevant nodes and decrypt the ciphertext or fake the digital signature of intercepted message. It implies that CDH, BDH, and q-SDH assumptions are effective for the adversary.
Intra-domain authentication protocol
We design intra-domain authentication protocol with the help of IPGS, CBS, and BF scheme [13] . The protocol includes initial authentication protocol as well as handover authentication protocol.
System initialization
As a root trust, TR generates system public parameter
, CBS, and BF. At the same time, TR publishes Param for all the entities in the system. Assume that DM and GW have completed IPGS. Auth and get warrants before MC's roaming. Besides, entities in the third layer have completed IPGS.join and obtain the corresponding warrant and public/private keys.
Initial authentication protocol
It will trigger the initial authentication protocol when MC leaves its WMN group for another WMN group in the same domain. In Fig. 1 , MC moves from WMN 1 to WMN 2 and connects with MR 2 . It is necessary for MC and MR 2 to execute mutual authentication protocol. The details of the protocol are described in Fig. 3 
Handover authentication protocol
When MC roams from one MR to another in the same WMN group, handover authentication protocol should be executed between MC and new access MR. As shown in Fig. 1 , when moving from MR 2 to MR 3 in WMN 2 , MC needs to take handover authentication with MR 3 following the steps in Fig. 4 .
( 
Inter-domain authentication protocol
When MC leaves its own WMN for another in the different domain,it needs to take inter-domain authentication with the access WMN. As Fig. 1 shows, MC leaves WMN2 in domain 1 for WMN 3 in domain 2 and connects with MR 4 , and it needs to complete mutual The difference between interdomain authentication protocol and initial authentication protocol is whether to verify the group public key of the other group. In our roaming scenario, MC and MR 4 should utilize IPGS.Verify-auth to verify PK g3 and PK g1 , respectively, during inter-domain authentication. While the other procedures are totally the same as initial authentication protocol.
Discussion
Security analysis
According to Fig. 1 , we make security analysis of our scheme in terms of reliability, traceability, anonymity, and unforgeability.
Reliability
First, adversary could not decrypt c 1 = ENCR_BF_PK GW2 (g a ) if he does not know GW 2BF_SK due to the fact that BF is safe under BDH assumption during initial authentication [13] . [11] . So MC is legitimate. To sum up, our handover authentication protocol is reliable.
Finally, the analysis of reliability of inter-domain authentication protocol is the same as initial authentication protocol.
Traceability
When a MC behaves illegally in a certain visiting WMN, the group manager(GM) should be equipped with the ability to disclose the real identity of that MC.
To achieve the traceability goal, GM first sends group signature δ 1 = SIGN_IPGS(TS 1 ) to the GM of MC's home WMN group who is able to open δ 1 and trace the real identity of MC with the clue of U = rx i P.
Anonymity
During initial authentication and inter-domain authentication process, access network can verify MC by checking whether the group signature δ 1 = SIGN_IPGS(TS 1 ) is legal or not. The access network only knows which group MC belongs to but cannot tell MC's real identity information. MC's privacy is thus guaranteed. Access network verifies MC through δ 2 = SIGN_CBS(TS 2 ) to handover authentication. We modify the CBS certificate as CERT_MC_g 2 = S g2 P A , P A = H 1 (PK GW2 ||MC CBS_PK ). MC's privacy is guaranteed since no identity information is included in the certificate. 
Unforgeability
Performance analysis
We use NS2 (Network Simulation version2) [14] [15] [16] [17] to simulate ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) protocol, our proposed scheme(HPAA) and JSEN [6] . We analyze the access authentication efficiency of these schemes in terms of handover delay.
According to the scenario defined in Fig. 1 , the experimental environment is constructed within a rectangular area of 1000 m × 1000 m as shown in Fig. 5 . MAC layer is assumed to be 802.11 MAC protocol. AODV is adopted as routing protocol. The simulation is under wireless environment as AODV does not support promiscuous mode between cable and wireless. FTP traffic flow is built between MC and CN through TCP at application layer, which begins at 1.0 s and finishes at 88.0 s. When simulation begins, MC moves from MR1 to MR4 at the speed of 10 m/s. The simulation time is 90 s. In the whole simulation, MC handovers three times. (1) MC moves from MR1 to MR2. Initial authentication protocol is executed among MC, MR2, and GW2; (2) MC leaves MR2 for MR3. Handover authentication occurs between MC and MR3; (3) MC moves on from MR3 to MR4. Inter-domain authentication protocol is triggered. 
Handover delay analysis
Handover delay is defined as a kind of communication interrupt between CN and MC when handover occurs. Handover delay can be analyzed through the serial number and receiving time of the TCP packet from CN to MC. Simulations are done for AODV, JSEN, and HPAA to observe their differences in handover delay. In order to eliminate the error and interference, all the experimental results are the average value of 20 times' simulation. Figure 6 shows the results when MC handovers for the first time. The handover delay of AODV, JSEN, and HPAA is 1.2, 2.1, and 1.8 s, respectively. Figure 7 shows the simulation results when MC handovers for the second time. The handover delay of AODV, JSEN, and HPAA is 1.1, 1.7, and 1.5 s, respectively. Figure 8 shows the simulation results while MC handovers for the third time. The handover delay of AODV, JSEN, and HPAA is 1.2, 2.2, and 2.1 s, respectively.
From the above results, we can draw the following conclusions. Mutual authentication is introduced in HPAA and JSEN together with some specific signature scheme for privacy protection. Compared with AODV, which has no concern of privacy-preserved authentication, the handover delay of HPAA and JSEN is obviously higher. However, the handover delay of HPAA is superior to JSEN, even approaches AODV with average 0.6 s higher, due to the introduction of CBS, shared-key negotiation method, and other optimizations during the handover authentication procedure.
Conclusions
Our scheme is different from other similar works because we combined the proxy group signature and identitybased group signature. And it has high efficiency and has less expense for saving and maintaining a routing table.
In this paper, we propose a proxy-based authentication scheme which is aimed at anonymous authentication for WMN. The scheme owes the following advantages.
(1) MC's privacy is safe due to the anonymous authentication; (2) The interactions are eliminated between home network and access network. This is because identity-based proxy group signature scheme makes a great effect; (3) The authentication delay no longer exists because of the implementation of efficient handover authentication by CBS.
Security and performance analysis show that our scheme is secure and efficient. How to integrate our scheme into the existed authentication protocol forms [18] [19] [20] our future research work.
